Epistemology #191
Bullshit (indifference to truth)
original term: bullshit (Eng.) · wciskanie kitu, blef komunikacyjny, pustosłowie
Central European lineage: 2 threads (anticipation) · 1919–1986 · jump to documentation ↓
Working Definition
In strict philosophical usage, bullshit is speech or writing produced with fundamental indifference toward whether its statements are true or false, governed instead solely by the goal of making a particular impression on the audience. The concept draws a sharp structural boundary between the liar and the bullshitter: a liar knows the truth (or believes they know it) and deliberately tries to steer the listener away from it, thereby remaining in a negative but genuine cognitive relation to facts; the bullshitter steps outside the game of truth altogether, deploying true and false claims interchangeably so long as they advance self-presentation or persuasion. In everyday speech the word simply means nonsense or falsehood; in Harry G. Frankfurt’s technical sense it names a distinct epistemic posture that is more corrosive to a culture of truth than lying, because it erodes the underlying norm that words answer to reality.
The horn tunes its performance to audience reaction while the instrument for checking reality sits untouched; unlike a deliberate liar, the speaker need not care what the facts are.
AI-assisted illustration · conceptual metaphor View in visual quiz →Genesis and Global Lineage
The concept was brought into contemporary analytic philosophy by the American moral philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt in his essay On Bullshit, first published in Raritan Quarterly Review in 1986 and reissued as a standalone book by Princeton University Press in 2005. Frankfurt built on Max Black’s analysis of humbug (1983) and traced the ancient archetype to Plato’s critique of sophistry—the art of manufacturing appearances of wisdom without care for knowledge. In 2002, the Oxford philosopher Gerald A. Cohen published an influential critique, Deeper into Bullshit, distinguishing Frankfurt’s agent-centered bluffing (characteristic of advertising, PR, and political spin) from output-centered academic bullshit—hermetic, unclarifiable theoretical prose whose propositions cannot be tested or disproved even when the author writes in dead earnest. Over the following two decades, the category expanded into the sociology of organizations (David Graeber’s Bullshit Jobs, 2018) and data science (Carl Bergstrom and Jevin West’s analysis of quantitative bullshit, 2020).
Central European Lineage
Although Frankfurt’s essay grew out of late twentieth-century American media and advertising culture, Central European thinkers had twice—first from analytic logic and later from anti-totalitarian dissidence—formulated remarkably close diagnoses of discourse severed from accountability to truth. At the turn of 1919 and 1920 in Lwów (now Lviv, Ukraine), Kazimierz Twardowski—a Vienna-trained student of Franz Brentano and founder of the Lvov–Warsaw School of logic and analytic philosophy—published his manifesto On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style (O jasnym i niejasnym stylu filozoficznym). Rejecting the romantic excuse that obscure prose reflects the depth of the subject, Twardowski showed that stylistic fog functions as a shield insulating an author’s claims from verification or refutation—directly anticipating Gerald A. Cohen’s later analysis of academic bullshit. A second Central European lineage runs through Polish and Czechoslovak analyses of Communist bureaucratic language (nowomowa, or Newspeak, studied by literary theorist Michał Głowiński in Warsaw and Václav Havel in Prague). In The Power of the Powerless (1978), Havel captured the moment when late-socialist propaganda ceased to be an Orwellian lie attempting to falsify economic statistics and became a ritual of compliance in which both the party apparatus and the citizen were utterly indifferent to the truth-value of the slogans displayed.
Documented regional lineage · Links: 2. Compiled: October 2026.
-
anticipation 67 years
Central European Source: Kazimierz Twardowski, “O jasnym i niejasnym stylu filozoficznym”; Lwów, Poland (now Lviv, Ukraine), 1919
Global Circulation: philosophical analysis of bullshit and sham discourse (On Bullshit) — Harry G. Frankfurt, 1986
-
anticipation 8 years
Central European Source: Václav Havel, “Moc bezmocných”; Prague / Hrádeček, Czechoslovakia (now Czechia), 1978
Global Circulation: speech calculated to make an impression with indifference to truth (On Bullshit) — Harry G. Frankfurt, 1986
anticipation
67 yearsKazimierz Twardowski, “O jasnym i niejasnym stylu filozoficznym”
1919 · Lwów, Poland (now Lviv, Ukraine)
philosophical analysis of bullshit and sham discourse (On Bullshit)
1986 · Harry G. Frankfurt
- Claim & Connection
- The founder of the Lvov–Warsaw School, Kazimierz Twardowski—educated in Vienna and from 1895 professor at the University of Lwów—published at the turn of 1919/1920 his programmatic critique of unclear philosophical style, exposing how murky terminology simulates depth while freeing the author from accountability for the truth-value of claims. This represents an early analytic diagnosis of the phenomenon Harry Frankfurt analyzed in 1986 as indifference to truth and Gerald A. Cohen later extended to opaque academic prose.
- Source Documentation
-
- primary source Kazimierz Twardowski, „O jasnym i niejasnym stylu filozoficznym”, Ruch Filozoficzny, t. V, nr 2, Lwów 1919–1920, s. 25–27 (przedruk w: Wybrane pisma filozoficzne, PWN, Warszawa 1965, s. 346–348); pp. 25–27: thesis that unclear style betrays muddy thought and insulates the author from the discipline of truth and falsity. rcin.org.pl ↗
- scholarly study Jan Woleński, „Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska”, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1985; Chapters 1–2: the ethos of clarity, anti-irrationalism, and responsibility for the word in Twardowski’s program. plato.stanford.edu ↗
- Historical Context
- An anticipation without documented direct influence on Frankfurt; Twardowski’s manifesto defined the Central European analytic tradition (Kotarbiński, Ajdukiewicz, Ossowska) that treated unfalsifiable verbiage as both a logical and an ethical failing.
anticipation
8 yearsVáclav Havel, “Moc bezmocných”
1978 · Prague / Hrádeček, Czechoslovakia (now Czechia)
speech calculated to make an impression with indifference to truth (On Bullshit)
1986 · Harry G. Frankfurt
- Claim & Connection
- In “Moc bezmocných” (“The Power of the Powerless,” 1978), Václav Havel demonstrated that the official language of late socialism had ceased to function as a classic lie (which tries to persuade the listener of a false factual description) and had become a ritual code signaling the speaker’s compliance, wholly detached from how things actually stand. This anticipated the institutional variant of the phenomenon Frankfurt defined eight years later.
- Source Documentation
-
- primary source Václav Havel, „Moc bezmocných” (październik 1978), archiwum ÚSD AV ČR; §§III–VI: analysis of the slogan in the greengrocer’s window as a semantically empty message serving solely to reproduce ritual compliance. disent.usd.cas.cz ↗
- reception / translation Harry G. Frankfurt, „On Bullshit”, Raritan Quarterly Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1986, s. 81–100 (wyd. książkowe: Princeton University Press, 2005); distinction between the liar and the bullshitter who is indifferent to the truth-value of statements. press.princeton.edu ↗
- Historical Context
- Whereas Frankfurt analyzed mainly advertising, public relations, and democratic campaigning, Havel described a coercive institutional variant in which citizens produce truth-indifferent formulas to avoid sanction.
Why Now
Between 2022 and 2026, Frankfurt’s concept acquired a precise engineering application with the mass deployment of large language models (LLMs). After the release of ChatGPT in November 2022, the AI industry adopted the psychological metaphor of “hallucination” to describe fabricated citations and false assertions. In June 2024, philosophers Michael T. Hicks, James Humphries, and Joe Slater at the University of Glasgow published the widely debated paper ChatGPT is bullshit in Ethics and Information Technology. They demonstrated that calling LLM fabrications “hallucinations” or “lies” anthropomorphizes the software by implying a perceptual apparatus or an intention to describe the world that momentarily malfunctioned. By contrast, a next-token prediction architecture is by design indifferent to propositional truth: it generates accurate summaries and invented court cases through the exact same mechanism—optimizing the statistical plausibility of sounding like a convincing human speaker.
Explanatory Power
Distinguishing lying from truth-indifference explains three contemporary communication pathologies where traditional fact-checking fails. The first is the political strategy of “flooding the zone”: a demagogue who fires off twenty contradictory claims in a single speech is not trying to maintain a coherent falsehood (like a classic liar who must remember yesterday’s alibi), but is staging a display of dominance over the news cycle; journalists who spend a week fact-checking one sentence lose because they treat performative bullshit as a botched factual assertion. The second example is corporate sustainability and governance jargon (ESG), where phrases about “holistic stakeholder synergy” are engineered to be legally unfalsifiable so no regulator or shareholder can sue for breach of promise. The third is quantitative bullshit (Bergstrom and West): dashboards packed with composite indices, cherry-picked time windows, and p-hacked regressions designed to intimidate lay audiences with the authority of numbers rather than test a hypothesis.
Axes of Debate
Intentional indifference of the speaker (Frankfurt) versus structural unclarifiability of the text (Cohen)
Analytic philosophers following Gerald A. Cohen (Deeper into Bullshit, 2002) criticize Frankfurt for psychologism: tying the definition to the speaker’s state of mind exonerates the author of opaque, unfalsifiable academic prose who sincerely believes in their own profundity. Strongest counterargument: Defenders of Frankfurt reply that collapsing the two erases a crucial moral distinction between a cynical manipulator (a spin doctor or propagandist) who knowingly abandons truth and a sincere, if muddled, thinker struggling with difficult concepts. Nature of the dispute: substantive — it determines whether the criterion of bullshit resides in the pragmatic intention of the speaker or in the logical-semantic properties of the text itself.
Large language models as bullshit machines (Hicks, Humphries, Slater) versus world models in neural weights
Philosophers of technology (Hicks and co-authors, 2024; building on Emily Bender and Timnit Gebru’s “stochastic parrots,” 2021) argue that because LLMs lack direct grounding in extralinguistic reality, every unverified output they produce is structurally Frankfurtian bullshit. Strongest counterargument: Researchers in mechanistic interpretability and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) counter that frontier models build coherent internal representations of causal and spatial relations in their hidden layers, and that coupling models with search tools, formal verifiers, and truthfulness reinforcement introduces a functional analogue of care for truth. Nature of the dispute: substantive — it asks whether epistemic grounding requires conscious subjective intention or can be achieved through reliable feedback loops and external verification architectures.
Strict epistemic purism versus the social function of phatic and diplomatic speech (Goffman)
Sociologists of interaction (in the tradition of Erving Goffman) point out that Frankfurt measures all human speech against the yardstick of a scientific seminar, whereas small talk, polite compliments, diplomacy, and ceremonial rhetoric are designed to maintain social cohesion and face rather than report facts. Strongest counterargument: Frankfurt and critics of public disinformation answer that phatic politeness is benign only so long as everyone understands the genre convention; the crisis begins when the logic of advertising and noncommittal flattery colonizes parliamentary debate, public health, and science. Nature of the dispute: mixed — it combines a substantive pragmatics distinction among speech acts with a normative defense of the public sphere against PR colonization.
Underappreciated Angle
Cognitive and organizational research (including Gordon Pennycook’s 2015 studies on “pseudo-profound bullshit”) reveals that inside modern bureaucracies, universities, and corporations, the proliferation of bullshit is rarely driven by personal dishonesty; far more often, it is a rational defensive adaptation to pathological evaluation metrics. When a university, ministry, or company forces staff to fill out endless grant rubrics, “vision statements,” and “social impact” forms while starving them of time and resources for substantive work, the institution itself mandates the production of smooth, unfalsifiable prose. In such an environment, a practitioner who writes plainly and makes testable commitments immediately exposes themselves to audit and blame if an experiment fails, whereas a producer of rounded bureaucratic bullshit becomes untouchable—because a claim that means nothing specific can never be caught in contradiction with reality.
One-Sentence Takeaway
The liar still pays homage to the truth by knowing it and hiding from it, whereas the bullshitter debases the currency of speech itself because they do not care what reality is.
Related Concepts Network
How this concept reinforces, constrains, or complements other analytical frameworks in the corpus. View on graph →
-
Model hallucinations reinforces
Philosophers of science argue that so-called hallucinations in large language models are, in the strict technical sense, Frankfurtian bullshit: the model generates statistically plausible token sequences without any internal concern for reference to the world.
-
AI slop complements
While bullshit describes the epistemic posture of an utterance indifferent to truth, AI slop names the industrial-scale flooding of the information ecosystem with mass-produced synthetic verbiage.
-
Post-truth reinforces
The post-truth condition rests not on sophisticated concealment of facts, but on widespread acceptance of discourse in which only tribal signaling and emotional impact matter.
-
Brandolini’s law reinforces
The cost asymmetry between producing nonsense and refuting it follows directly from the fact that the bullshitter pays zero cost for verification or consistency, whereas the critic must reconstruct the burden of proof.
-
Ketman and living in truth complements
Havel’s call to “live in truth” was directed precisely against the daily reproduction of ideological bullshit, which erodes moral agency more insidiously than open coercion.
-
Context collapse reinforces
Having to address multiple incompatible audiences simultaneously on social platforms rewards smooth, noncommittal corporate jargon and bluffing over falsifiable claims.
-
Metamodernism in tension
Metamodernism’s oscillation between irony and new sincerity seeks to recover earnest judgment in a culture numbed by decades of advertising and political bullshit.
Reading Canon & Translation Bridge
Foundational texts, introductions, and critical perspectives—with availability of English and Polish editions.
-
foundational text 2005 · English
Harry G. Frankfurt, On Bullshit
The 2005 book edition of the 1986 essay establishing the canonical distinction between lying (which requires knowing the truth) and bullshitting (which is indifferent to how things actually are).
In English: original text written in English
In Polish: “O wciskaniu kitu”, Czarne 2008, trans. Hanna Pustuła
-
critical perspective 2002 · English
Gerald A. Cohen, Deeper into Bullshit
A key analytic correction showing that alongside intentional bluffing (Frankfurt’s focus) there exists structural, output-defined bullshit—murky, unclarifiable academic prose in which the author sincerely believes their own apparent profundity.
In English: original text written in English
In Polish: no Polish edition
-
introduction & synthesis 2020 · English
Carl T. Bergstrom, Jevin D. West, Calling Bullshit: The Art of Skepticism in a Data-Driven World
An accessible guide demonstrating how twenty-first-century rhetorical verbiage has been supplemented by quantitative bullshit: truncated axes, spurious correlations, and p-hacking.
In English: original text written in English
In Polish: “Na tropie ściemy. Sztuka sceptycyzmu w świecie rządzonym przez dane”, Grupa Wydawnicza Relacja 2021, trans. Katarzyna Mojkowska
-
cross-disciplinary 2018 · English
David Graeber, Bullshit Jobs: A Theory
Transposes the category from philosophy of language to the anthropology of work: analyzes white-collar roles whose existence even the employee cannot justify except as maintaining an organizational facade.
In English: original text written in English
In Polish: “Praca bez sensu. Teoria”, Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej 2019, trans. Mikołaj Denderski
-
cross-disciplinary 2024 · English
Michael T. Hicks, James Humphries, Joe Slater, ChatGPT is bullshit
A widely cited paper in “Ethics and Information Technology” arguing that false outputs of large language models are neither hallucinations nor lies, but a textbook instantiation of Frankfurt’s definition.
In English: original text written in English
In Polish: no Polish edition
-
introduction & synthesis 1919 · Polish
Kazimierz Twardowski, O jasnym i niejasnym stylu filozoficznym
The concise founding manifesto of the Lvov–Warsaw School, offering a rigorous criterion for separating genuine inquiry from the solemn simulation of wisdom.
In English: “On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style (w: On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy)”, Rodopi 1999, trans. Arthur Szylewicz
In Polish: original text written in Polish
Primary-Source Quotes
It is impossible for someone to lie unless he thinks he knows the truth. Producing bullshit requires no such conviction.